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Abstract
This paper analyses recent key developments in euro-area government bond
markets and their main implications for central banks and for market functioning. The
introduction of the euro is found to have significantly affected the relative pricing of
securities. The spreads over German bonds of previously high-yield debt have narrowed
significantly whereas the spreads of all other euro-area sovereign debt have widened
following the introduction of the euro. Market microstructure factors, such as relative market
liquidity and the cheapest-to-deliver status of bonds, are also found to play a part in
determining relative prices in addition to differences in credit risk. Finally, the evidence
suggests that the reduction in the relative supply of government bonds has hitherto had a
limited effect in the euro area, in contrast to the evidence in the US market.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Government securities markets have traditionally played an important role for both
central banks and private agents. From the standpoint of central banks, certain indicators
for assessing the inflation and output outlook have normally been derived from pricing data
collected in these markets. From the point of view of private agents, these securities are
used as a risk-free investment, as collateral, as a benchmark for pricing fixed-income
securities and for hedging interest rate risks. The important role played by government
securities is the result of a number of characteristics that distinguish them from other
securities. These include minimal credit risk, high market liquidity, a wide range of maturities
and well-developed market infrastructure.
In the euro area, recent developments in and the functioning of government
securities markets have been affected by a number of factors including the introduction of
the euro and the reduction in the relative supply of government bonds. The removal of
foreign exchange risk within the euro area since the start of Monetary Union has eliminated
one of the elements that previously differentiated existing securities and, consequently,
should have altered trading strategies and relative prices. The reduction in the relative
supply of bonds as a consequence of the improvement of public finances raises the
question about how the functions performed by these markets are going to change.
Against this background, the goal of this paper is to describe recent developments in
euro-area government bond markets and to discuss their implications for both the
information content of prices and market functioning. It is found that the introduction of the
euro has significantly affected the relative pricing of securities. In particular, the 10-year
spreads over German bonds of previous high-yield debt have dropped whereas the spreads
of all other euro-area sovereign debt have widened. Market microstructure factors, such as
relative market liquidity and the cheapest-to-deliver status of bonds, are also found to play a
part in determining relative prices in addition to differences in credit risk. Finally, the
reduction in the relative supply of government bonds is seen hitherto to have had a limited
effect on the euro area, in contrast to the evidence in the US market.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the main factors
driving market developments and Section 3 discusses their impact on portfolio composition
and trading activity. Section 4 is the core of the paper and analyses pricing developments
and their implications. Section 5 discusses the outlook for euro-area government bond
markets and, finally, the last section draws the main conclusions.
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2. MAIN FACTORS DRIVING MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
The introduction of the euro
The elimination of foreign exchange risk within the euro area since the start of
Monetary Union has eliminated one of the elements that previously differentiated existing
bonds. This has resulted in an increase in the degree of substitutability among securities
issued by different treasuries. At the same time, other elements such as credit risk and
market liquidity may have gained in importance. These changes may have affected both
pricing and trading activity. As regards pricing, the level and the dynamics of yield spreads
between different national issuers will no longer reflect foreign exchange factors. The
portfolio composition and trading strategies of investors have been affected through
different channels. Firstly, currency-driven strategies are no longer feasible. Secondly, the
scope for risk diversification among national securities has been reduced. And, finally, the
introduction of the euro has removed certain legal barriers to cross-border investment such
as currency matching rules, which traditionally limited the possibilities of certain investors –
especially pension funds and insurance companies- investing in foreign currency.
Besides the aforementioned effects, the introduction of the euro has had other more
indirect effects. In particular, the search for market liquidity has fostered competition
between issuers to attract investors and has prompted some reorganisation of the market
structure. On the side of the issuers, some significant changes have been observed since
the start of Monetary Union. In this respect, mention may be made of the efforts by national
treasuries to increase market transparency through different means such as the introduction
of pre-announced auction calendars. Additionally, issue sizes have generally tended to
increase. In some countries, the creation of large issues was facilitated by the introduction
of programmes to exchange old illiquid bonds for new bonds and by the concentration of
issuance activity in a smaller number of benchmark securities. Some of the smaller issuers,
such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, have resorted to syndication
procedures instead of traditional auctions with the aim of reaching a larger set of investors.
Others, such as the French Treasury have introduced new instruments such as constant
maturity and inflation-indexed bonds to attract more investors. Other institutional changes
introduced were the harmonisation of market conventions such as the computation of
yields, and the existence of a single trading calendar.
As regards the organisation of the markets, one notable development has been the
creation of electronic pan-European exchanges for debt securities. So far, the most
successful trading platform has been EuroMTS, a screen-based exchange owned by a
number of the largest banks active in the European market. Currently, issues of the major
euro-area treasuries and some large highly rated private bonds are listed on this trading
platform. Both spot and repo transactions are admitted. BrokerTec is another example of a
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recently created electronic trading platform. However, its market share is considerably
lower. At the national level, there have been initiatives aimed at concentrating trading
activity in a limited number of platforms.1 In the futures markets, some small and medium
exchanges have established alliances to better cope with competition from the biggest
exchanges.
In the case of settlement systems, there have been initiatives geared to achieving a
higher degree of integration. In this regard, the introduction of links between national central
securities depositories and the merger of the two international central securities
depositories with existing national central depositories should be highlighted.2
To sum up, the introduction of the euro has increased the degree of substitutability of
securities and has contributed to reducing the extent of fragmentation among euro-area
government bond markets. Advances in market integration are also explained by other
factors such as the implementation of the Single Market for financial services and
technological changes.  The euro-area government bond markets are increasingly seen as
one single market that is comparable in terms of size to the US or Japanese markets (Table
1). However, the multiplicity of issuers and differences in credit rating distinguishes the
euro-area government market from its corresponding US and Japanese counterparts. In
spite of the advances in integration, euro-area government bond markets are currently far
from being completely integrated. Some factors frequently mentioned as contributing to
some degree of fragmentation are the lack of integration of the settlement system and the
different tax regimes and market conventions.3
The reduction in the relative supply of government bonds
Over the last few years the share of the stock of government paper has trended
downwards in the euro-denominated fixed-income markets. More specifically, between end-
1996 and mid-2001, the share of the stock of government paper has decreased by more
than five percentage points (Table 2). This process is the result of both a slowdown in
government issuing activity, due to the improvement in fiscal deficits, and the surge in the
stock of private paper.
The shrinking supply of government securities may have three different effects on
their pricing. Firstly, since lower debt obligations mean an improvement in the credit
standing, the yield demanded by investors will be lower. Secondly, scarcity of risk-free
securities may further reduce the yield demanded by investors in comparison with other
securities. This effect, which is sometimes called the scarcity premium, might arise if there
                                                                
1 See ECB (2001) for more details of recent changes in market infrastructure in the euro-area bond markets.
2 Cedel merged with Deutsche Börse Clearing to form Clearstream International. Euroclear merged with CBISSO and
Sicovam to the Euroclear group.
3 See IMF(2001b), Santillán et al. (2000) and ECB (2001).
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are no substitute securities with similar characteristics. Finally, the reduction in size may
negatively affect market liquidity and, as a consequence, investors would demand an extra
yield –liquidity premium- to compensate for the lower market liquidity. Thus, from a
theoretical standpoint, the impact on the yield level of the reduction in the relative supply is
ambiguous.
The existence of the aforementioned idiosyncratic elements in the prices of
government securities may have some implications for the information content of the
interest rates and for market functioning. More specifically, certain indicators frequently
used by central banks to extract information on the output and inflation outlook, such as the
quality spread (the yield differential between corporate bonds and government bonds) and
the term spread (the differential between long-term and short-term yields) might be
distorted. Similarly, the usefulness of government securities as a benchmark for pricing
other fixed-income assets may also be affected. Finally, the presence of these idiosyncratic
elements will reduce the effectiveness to hedge interest rate risk with government
securities, provided that they are time-varying.
Other effect of the reduction in the supply of government securities is the lesser
availability of a risk-free asset for investment and for use as collateral in monetary policy
operations, intraday credit or in private transactions. For example, during the last quarter of
2000, these types of securities accounted for 56% of collateral used by Eurosystem
counterparties for monetary policy and for intraday credit.
3. DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION AND TRADING
ACTIVITY
The information available clearly shows that the process of geographical
diversification initiated in the mid-1990s in the euro-area government debt markets has
continued at a more rapid pace since the start of the Monetary Union. According to the
figures of Table 3, the share of the stock of euro-area government securities held by non-
residents has increased by 7 percentage points between 1998 and 2000. This evidence
suggests that the introduction of the euro has contributed to a geographical reallocation of
portfolios. The removal of certain legal barriers, such as currency matching rules, and
greater market integration after the introduction of the euro may have played a part in this
process.
As regards trading activity, the most significant development has been in the bond
futures markets. Since the last quarter of 1998 trading activity has increasingly been
concentrated in the futures based on German bonds and traded in Eurex (Table 4). This
process was driven by the high substitutability of existing contracts after the removal of
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foreign exchange risk within the euro area countries. Turnover of futures based on French,
Italian and Spanish bonds decreased to very low historical levels and, as a consequence,
their liquidity was seriously damaged. This situation changed slightly in 2000 when Euronext
introduced a number of measures to improve the attractiveness of its contracts, including
the extension of the list of deliverable bonds to some euro-area non-French bonds –
German and Dutch bonds.  Thereafter, turnover in bond futures traded in MATIF recovered
to pre-EMU levels, but continued to be relatively low when compared with the contracts
traded in Eurex.
The increasing trading activity in the futures based on German bonds was also
reflected in the open interest of the contracts to the point that it frequently exceeded the
outstanding amount of deliverable bonds. This has sometimes favoured situations, known
as squeezes, under which a small number of participants acquire a large proportion of the
stock of deliverable bonds before the maturity of the contract with the aim of obtaining a
profit. If the strategy succeeds, the short position holders in the futures contract are obliged
to borrow deliverable bonds and lend money at below market rates in the repo market. The
latest squeeze is reported to have involved the 5-year contract maturing in March 2001.
Other squeezes occurred in September 1998 and June 1999. The existence of squeezes
may introduce potential efficiency-reducing distortions in the pricing of securities traded in
the spot, derivative and repo markets.4
Another relevant development recently observed in Eurex is the growing importance
of contracts based on 2- and 5-year bonds. The cumulative trading volumes of these two
contracts are currently similar to those observed with the 10-year contract. These
movements probably reflect a change in investor trading strategies, which are more
balanced along the yield curve.
In the spot markets, recent changes in trading patterns seem to have been less
dramatic. In some small markets, such as the Irish market, a drop in trading figures has
been observed. Similarly, trading with Italian government bonds in the MTS market has
continued declining since the start of Monetary Union, a trend initiated in 1998. However,
this process seems to reflect, at least partially, a shift to the Euro MTS platform rather than
a lower trading volume with Italian securities. In the Spanish market, trading has increased
slightly after the introduction of the euro but the turnover ratio has dropped. By contrast,
trading figures for French government bonds show a robust increase as compared with pre-
EMU levels –the monthly average volume during 1999-2001 was 37% higher than that in
1996-1998. Similarly, there is some evidence of growing trading activity with German
government bonds.5 However, the lack of more detailed data in some markets and the
                                                                
4 The pricing effects due to the existence of the futures market are studied in Section 4.
5 BIS (2001b) reports a significant increase in trading volumes with German bonds using data on the most actively traded
bonds that are settled through Euroclear.
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absence of information in others do not allow us to know to what extent a process of
concentration towards the most liquid markets has also occurred in this market segment.
Trading conducted through EuroMTS has risen significantly since its creation in
1999. It is estimated that in 2000 about 40% of bond transactions were traded through this
platform.6
The evidence in this Section suggests that overall trading activity and, as a result,
liquidity, has not been significantly affected by the reduction in the relative supply of bonds,
which contrasts with the evidence in the US market, where liquidity seems to have
deteriorated recently.7 At the same time, some concentration of liquidity towards the main
markets at the expense of others has occurred since the introduction of the euro.
4. PRICING DEVELOPMENTS
4.1. The relative pricing of euro-area government bonds after the introduction of the
euro
Determinants of yield spreads
The removal of foreign exchange risk since the start of Monetary Union eliminated
one of the determinants of the yield spreads between euro-area government bonds. To
approximate the importance of this effect, the average 10-year yield spreads over German
bonds of euro-area government bonds in the pre-EMU period (1996-1998) are broken down
into two components: i) the foreign exchange factor, and ii) other factors, which mainly
include differences in credit risk and market liquidity. The first component is estimated as
the spread between the swap rate in the currency of denomination of the bond and the
swap rate in DM. 8 Given that most of the participants present in the different currency
segments of the underlying swap market (the eurodeposit market) are the same, differences
in swap rates should mainly capture foreign exchange factors.9
Table 5 shows the results of the exercise, together with the average yield spreads
over German bonds after the introduction of the euro (1999-June 2001). It can be seen that
the foreign exchange factor was the main component of the spread in those countries with
wider spreads, such as Italy, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Finland and Ireland. In these
countries the introduction of the euro has meant a significant reduction in their debt’ yield
                                                                
6 See Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001).
7 See Fleming (2000).
8 All pricing data used in this paper are taken from Bloomberg, unless otherwise stated.
9 Part of the differences in swap rates may also reflect differences in liquidity.
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spread over German bonds. The removal of foreign exchange risk has also been reflected
in a reduction in the yield volatility for debt issued by these countries (Chart 1). Conversely,
the yield volatility of the other countries’ debt has shown minor changes between both
periods and their yield spreads over German bonds have increased (Table 5).
Interestingly, on removing the foreign exchange factor from yield spreads in the pre-
EMU period, it can be seen that all yield spreads over German bonds have widened. A
number of factors may account for this evidence. First, the concentration of trading activity
in the German market, at least in the futures segment, and the fact that the credit and
liquidity component has risen more intensively for debt issued by smaller countries such as
Austria, Belgium and Finland, denote that liquidity differences vis-à-vis German bonds may
have widened since the introduction of the euro. Second, observed changes might partly
reflect a change in the price assigned by the market to these factors, perhaps as a
consequence of the higher degree of market integration – i.e. before Monetary Union
differences in liquidity and credit risk were not completely priced due to market
segmentation. Finally, it cannot be ruled out that part of the change in the credit risk and
liquidity component is upward biased due to the following two factors. First, before EMU
differences in credit standing were partly captured in the foreign exchange factor since
governments had the possibility of monetising debt denominated in local currency to
prevent default, which ultimately would be reflected as a devaluation of the local currency.
Since the start of Monetary Union this option is no longer feasible given the no bail-out
clause in the EU Treaty.10 Second, if swap spreads between currencies partly reflected
differences in liquidity, the estimated foreign exchange component would be biased upward
and, consequently, the credit and liquidity component would be downward biased. In any
case, the increase in the yield spread for countries in which the foreign exchange
component was not significant indicates that these biases do not fully explain the rise in the
price of liquidity and credit risk.
To better understand the determinants of the yield spreads between euro-area
government debts, Chart 2 depicts the 10-year yields for the 12 euro-area countries
government debt by risk category in June 2001. These categories have been created
combining the ratings assigned to sovereign debt by S&P and Moody’s.11 Seven different
categories are considered. The first category is made up of highest-rated debts whereas the
                                                                
10 Notwithstanding, the fact that the liquidity and credit risk component was relatively high in countries with the lowest ratings
such as Italy, Belgium and Spain indicates that not all of the differences in credit standing were reflected in the foreign
exchange factor.
11 S&P and Moody’s rate debt using different codes, but their rating categories can be ordered in comparable levels of risk.
For instance, the AAA and AA+ ratings of S&P are equivalent, respectively, to the Moody’s Aaa and Aa1 ratings. In practice,
these rating agencies either give equivalent ratings to the same issuer or have them differ by just one level. Taking into
account this fact, debt has been included in categories 1, 3, and 5 that is equivalently rated by both agencies corresponding,
respectively, to the first, second, and third-best rate levels. Categories 2, 4 and 6 include debt that is not equivalently rated by
these agencies. For instance, category 2 includes debt rated in the first level by one agency and in the second level by the
other. And, finally, category 7 includes debt having rates below the third- best level.
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seventh includes the lowest-rated debts. A positive correlation between risk and yield
clearly emerge from the Chart, suggesting that credit risk plays an important role in
explaining yield spreads in the euro-area government bond markets. However, significant
differences in yields among some debts having a similar risk are observed, particularly
within highly rated debt. For instance, it is worth noting that the yield spread between the
Austrian and German bonds is even higher than that of the Austrian and lower-rated
securities such as Greek debt. This indicates that credit risk alone is not sufficient to explain
yield spreads, which means that other factors such as market liquidity must also play an
important role.
An in-depth analysis is now made of the importance of market microstructure
factors, such as liquidity, in the relative pricing of euro-area government bonds. To do this,
zero-coupon yield curves from January 1999 to May 2001 are first estimated for the two
markets considered as having the highest liquidity, the German and French markets.12 Initial
analysis of the results of this exercise reveals some significant changes after May 2000.
Given this evidence, the analysis below considers two sub-periods (1/1/99-30/4/00 and
1/05/00-28/5/01). Chart 3 shows the average difference between both curves in these two
sub-periods. In the first, French bonds appear to have on average a lower yield for horizons
between 2 and 12 years whereas for longer horizons German bonds display a lower yield.
These results denote that, during this period, the benchmark yield curve for euro interest
rates was made up of more than one issuer. This evidence seems to indicate that, in the
German market, liquidity tends to be more concentrated than in the other two exchanges.
In the second sub-period, a widening of spreads in favour of German bonds is
observed to the point that these securities display a lower yield for all horizons. This result
probably reflects an improvement in the relative liquidity of German bonds, especially in the
medium-term sector. The increasing turnover observed in the 2- and 5-year futures
contracts based on German bonds (see Section 3) seems to support this view. Thus, it is
apparent from this evidence that over the last few months the German market has achieved
benchmark status for all maturities. Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out that part of the
widening is attributable to other factors such as credit risk considerations, although that
does not seem plausible.
With the aim of confirming these findings, the liquidity effects for certain groups of
bonds are now studied. More specifically, a comparison is made of the yield errors –i.e. the
difference between observed and estimated yields- for certain groups of bonds within a
range of maturities. In this case, a single zero-coupon yield curve using German and French
bonds is estimated. Note that this approach, unlike the simple comparison of yields, allows
                                                                
12 More specifically, the zero-coupon yield curve is estimated using the Nelson and Siegel model and minimising the
squared errors in prices adjusted by the inverse of the duration. This procedure normally estimates with relatively low error the
medium and long-term sector of the curve.
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us to control for differences in cash flow structures. Table 6 shows some descriptive
statistics of the differences in yield errors for different groups of securities between January
1999 and May 2001. Results are shown for the whole sample and for two sub-periods
(1/1/99-30/4/00 and 1/05/00-28/5/01).
Regarding on-the-run issues for typical maturities (newly issued bonds with 2-, 5-
10-, and 30-year maturities13), three main results emerge from Table 6. Firstly, German
bonds appear to have, on average, a lower yield in both sub-periods, suggesting that the
German market is the most liquid for on-the-run issues. Secondly, liquidity differences seem
to be relatively more important for 10-year bonds. And, finally, a widening of spreads is
observed in the second sub-sample, denoting an increasing preference of investors for
German bonds.
The evidence for off-the-run issues is slightly different, especially for bonds with a
term-to-maturity lower than 10 years. More specifically, it is found that, in the first sub-
period, French bonds with a term to maturity lower than 10 years used to trade at a lower
yield than comparable German bonds. This implies a higher degree of liquidity in the French
market in this maturity sector. However, in the second sub-period, German bonds appear to
have a lower yield in the same maturity sector, indicating an improvement in their degree of
liquidity. In the 10- to 30-year sector, the German market appears in both sub-periods as
having the lowest yields. And, again, a widening of spreads in favour of German bonds is
found in this sector. These results seem to confirm that the German market has finally
achieved benchmark status for all maturity ranges.
Let us now examine in depth the impact on pricing of market microstructure factors. To
do this, the focus is placed on the German market and the estimated yield errors from 1999
to May 2001 are analysed using the securities issued by the German Treasury. Of particular
interest here are liquidity effects and the impact on yields of the futures market. Observation
of these errors shows that newly issued bonds normally display a negative yield error –i.e.
the observed yield is below the estimated curve- that is sometimes very significant (up to
about 20 basis points), especially in the 10-year sector. Yield errors of the bonds with
cheapest-to-deliver status in the futures market also tend to be negative, but they are
normally much closer to zero. These results imply that liquidity factors play an important role
in determining relative yields in the German market, whereas the impact of the futures
market seems much more limited.
To test more formally for these effects, the zero-coupon yield curve is re-estimated
introducing a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the last two on-the-run issues and 0
                                                                
13 These are the only maturities issued by the German Treasury during the sample period. Over the same period, the
French Treasury has been issuing mainly at these maturities. However, it has sometimes issued at other maturities such as 7-
8 years and 15 years.
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otherwise. Table 7 shows the main results of the exercise. The parameter of this variable is
negative and statistically significant for most of the sample and its average value is –6.4
basis points. The results by sub-period show no significant changes. This evidence points to
the existence of significant liquidity premia in the relative pricing of German bonds. The
same exercise is replicated for both the French and the Spanish markets in order to make
comparisons. Table 7 shows the results. Liquidity premia in these markets appear, on
average, to be less significant than in the case of the German market.
Analysis now turns to the impact on yields of the cheapest-to-deliver status in the
German market. Given the small sample of securities affected by this status –a maximum of
three- the yield errors of these bonds are compared with those of a similar security, instead
of introducing a dummy variable. More specifically a match is made, for every futures
contract and maturity, between the cheapest-to-deliver bond and another security with a
similar duration and age.14 The difference of yield errors between these two bonds is then
regressed on a constant and a dummy variable that takes the value 1 during the period in
which the bond has cheapest-to-deliver status. For each case, the period considered runs
from the delivery day of the previous maturity up to three months after the delivery day of
the current maturity. The parameter of the dummy variable captures the relative impact on
pricing caused by the futures market on cheapest-to-deliver bonds. However, this
parameter does not capture other possible general effects caused by the futures market on
all securities within a maturity sector. The parameter of the dummy variable turns out to be
negative  (-2.8 basis points) and statistically significant, suggesting that cheapest-to-deliver
bonds tend to have a yield below otherwise similar bonds. However, this effect is
quantitatively less significant than the impact on yields associated with benchmark status.
To check the robustness of this result and to analyse the effect for the different
maturities and contracts, the regression is repeated separately for every maturity and
contract. In the individual regressions the parameter that captures the impact of the futures
market turns out to be negative and statistically significant in 12 out of 13 cases. The
minimum value of the parameter (-8.8 basis points) corresponds to the 2-year cheapest-to-
deliver bond of the June 1999 contract, which was affected by a squeeze.
Implications for the information content of the yield curve and for market functioning
The multiplicity of sovereign issuers in the euro area and the impact on pricing of
market microstructure effects have implications for both the information content of the yield
curve derived from government bond markets and for market functioning. From the point of
view of the information content of interest rates, these factors complicate the estimation of a
benchmark yield curve for euro interest rates using government debt markets. In fact, the
previously reported evidence indicates that, for some of the period analysed, the benchmark
                                                                
14 The cheapest-to-deliver bond is approximated as the bond whose amount delivered was the maximum.
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yield curve was made up of more than one issuer. In addition, the existence of market
microstructure effects may distort the information content of certain indicators frequently
used by central banks, such as the term and the quality spreads. From the point of view of
market functioning, the usefulness of government bonds for pricing private debt and for
hedging interest rate risk may be affected, especially if the market microstructure effects are
time-varying.
4.2. The reduction in the relative supply of government bonds
Impact on yields
In Section 2 it was argued that the reduction in the relative supply of government bonds
may have three different effects on yield levels: it may reduce the yield due to the
improvement in the credit standing of treasuries, increase (or introduce) a scarcity premium
and increase the liquidity premium. The first two imply a reduction in the yield level whereas
the latter has the opposite effect. This section tests for these effects in both the euro-area
and in the US markets. The focus will be on yield spreads over other securities rather than
yield levels in order to control for general movements in interest rates caused, for example,
by changes in expectations about future interest rates or inflation. More specifically, the
swap spread (the differential between swap rates and government bond yields) will be used,
given the high liquidity of the swap market. Notwithstanding, part of the movement of the
swap spreads may reflect changes in credit risk. 15 To control for this effect a credit-risk-
adjusted swap spread will be computed.
Chart 4 shows 10-year swap spreads in the US and in the euro-area markets. The latter
series is proxied using German bonds and, in the pre-EMU period, DM swap rates. As is
apparent from Chart 4, in the US market the swap spread has changed significantly over
the last 2 to 3 years, in contrast to its relative stability between 1992 and 1997. The
widening of the spread during the autumn of 1998 possibly reflected the flight to quality
resulting from the financial crisis and events such as the LTCM hedge fund crisis. Between
mid-1999 and 2000 Q2 the swap spread widened again, coinciding with the announcement
and the implementation of the buyback programme by the US Treasury. During this latter
period the swap spread reached record levels (more than 135 basis points), about 95 basis
points above the average level of 1991-1997 and significantly above the level observed
during the autumn 1998 events. Since 2000 Q3 the swap spread has trended downwards.
Notwithstanding, as at mid-2001 it stood above average historical levels.
In the euro-area markets, a similar pattern to that followed by the corresponding
swap spread in the US market was observed, although some notable differences appear.
Firstly, the spread showed a much more stable pattern as from 1999. For example, the
                                                                
15 Most of the banks in the LIBOR contributor are rated AA (see BIS (2001b)).
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peak level during this period was around 70 basis points, i.e. 40 basis points above the
average level in 1991-1997. Secondly, the spread peaked later (August 2000), coinciding
with the auction of UMTS licences in Europe, which provided high revenues to some
European governments. Thirdly, the level observed at mid-2001 was closer to average
historical levels.
To analyse to what extent recent patterns in swap spreads are driven or not by credit
risk factors, resort is had to the following regression:
tititi credsp ,, eba ++=
where spi,t is the 10-year swap spread in market i (i=dollar, euro) at time t, and credt is the
yield spread between 10-year B and AAA-rated corporate bonds in the US market. This
variable proxies global credit risks. It is implicitly assumed that credit risk shocks
proportionately affect lower rated bonds more and, as a consequence, the yield spread
between risk categories should proxy credit risk. It is also assumed that the coefficient of
this variable is the same for both currencies given that most of the counterparties present in
the underlying market for swaps are the same (eurodeposit market).16 Use is made of
weekly data computed as an average of daily rates to limit the impact of measurement
errors such as the lack of synchronous rates. As expected, the estimated coefficient b is
positive and significant, meaning that swap spreads are partly driven by changes in credit
risk.
Chart 5 shows 10-year swap spreads adjusted for credit risk, which are computed as
the sum of the constant and residuals of the regression, for both the US and euro-area
markets. The adjusted spreads show, over the last three years, a similar pattern to that
followed by the corresponding unadjusted spreads, although movements appear to be
slightly more stable. This evidence suggests that the swap spreads have been partly driven
by idiosyncratic factors affecting the treasury market.
In the US market, the adjusted swap spread peaked in April 2000 at about 100 b.p. –
i.e. about 80 b.p. above the average level between 1991 and 1997. Since 2000 Q3 this
spread has trended downwards and in July 2001 it stood around 30 b.p. above the average
level of 1991-1997.  In other words, this evidence suggests that the shrinking supply of
treasury bonds in the US market has had a negative impact on the yields of treasury
securities, meaning that the scarcity premium has prevailed over the liquidity premium,
despite the evidence of the decreasing liquidity of the US government bond market reported
by some authors.17,18 The downward trend of the adjusted spread since 2000 Q3 may
                                                                
16 Since 1999 the euro-area swaps have been based on the Euribor instead of the Libor. The contributor panel in the Euribor
is much wider than that of the Libor.
17 See Fleming (2000).
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reflect some correction of the imbalances between supply and demand. Possibly, some
market participants have found highly rated private instruments as replacements for
government securities, such as those issued by US agencies. In this regard, some of these
agencies (Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae) have announced the regular issuance of large
amounts of bonds in a range of maturities and, in March 2000, the CME, the CBOT and the
Cantor Exchange launched futures and options contracts on agency bonds.
In the euro area, the adjusted swap spread peaked in August 2000 at around 30 b.p.
–i.e. about 30 b.p. the average level of the period 1991-1997. In July 2001 this spread was
around the average level of 1991-1997, meaning that the scarcity premium was no longer
embedded in euro-area government bond prices.
All told, this evidence seems to indicate that the effects on yields of the relative
reduction of government bonds have been much more limited in the euro area than in the
US. This result is not surprising bearing in mind that, contrary to what has occurred in the
US, in the euro area the stock of government bonds has continued growing and will
foreseeably continue on this path in the coming years.
Implications for the information content of the yield curve and for market functioning
The above discussion suggests that the quality spread in the US was significantly
affected by changes in the scarcity premium embedded in the government bonds yields, i.e.
movements in this spread did not only reflect changes in the private credit risk premium.
Similarly, the possible different behaviour of the scarcity premium along the yield
curve may have affected the information content of the term spread.  Chart 6 shows the
term spread computed as the difference between the 10-year and the 2-year yields using
data from both the government debt and swap markets in the US. Between 1999 and 2000,
large discrepancies between both indicators are observed in both the level and the intensity
of changes. In this respect, it is worth noting that, during 2000, even the sign of this
indicator was different depending on the data used: it was negative when using data from
the government debt market, but positive in the other case. The foregoing evidence implies
that the information content of the government bond yield curve for inflation and output has
been significantly affected in the US due to imbalances between supply and demand.
In the euro area, the relatively higher stability of the adjusted swap spread during
1999 and 2000 means that the information content of the government bond yield curve was
                                                                                                                                          
18 Note that this approach does not allow for the analysis of potential effects on yields caused by the improved credit
standing of the US Treasury since this effect will probably be reflected, at least partially, in the foreign exchange risk premium
demanded by investors and, therefore, will also affect other debt securities denominated in dollars.
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less affected by the reduction in the relative supply of these securities. Chart 7 confirms that
discrepancies in the term spread derived form the swap and the government debt market
were relatively limited, although a widening between both indicators was also observed
during 2000.
Apart from the impact on information content, the distortions in the US government
bond yield curve caused by the shrinking supply of these securities may have affected
some other functions performed by the treasury securities market.  For instance, the
usefulness of treasury securities for pricing private securities and the efficiency of using
these assets for hedging private interest rate risk may have diminished. To test for these
effects the correlation between government and private bond 10-year yields is now
analysed using a weekly frequency.  It is apparent from Chart 8 that these correlations
dropped significantly during the autumn 1998 crisis for all rating categories. More recently,
these have dropped again, although less dramatically. Chart 9 shows that a similar pattern
is found when computing these correlations using swap rates instead of government
securities yields. This evidence seems to indicate that, at least at a weekly frequency, the
decreasing efficiency of using treasury securities to hedge interest rate risk has not been
driven by idiosyncratic factors of the treasury market.
Table 8 reports correlations of treasuries and swaps with corporate bonds, using
different frequencies (1 week, 4 weeks and 8 weeks) and for two sub-periods: 1991-1997
and 1999-2001.19 Three important features emerge from Table 8. First, correlations
decrease between both sub-periods irrespective of the frequency and instrument (treasury
bond or swap). Second, the relative performance of swaps as a hedging vehicle tends to
increase with the horizon. Third, in the second sub-period swaps appear to be the best
hedging instruments for horizons of 8-weeks, in contrast to the first period, in which
treasuries were relatively superior.
Thus, this evidence indicates that idiosyncratic factors affecting the pricing of US
government securities have contributed somewhat to lowering the efficiency of using
treasury securities to hedge interest rate risk in horizons of 8-weeks or more. However,
other factors, such as credit risk, have also contributed to this phenomenon.
In the euro area, a similar process of decreasing correlations between the yields on
private and government securities has also been observed recently (Chart 10), likewise
implying the decreasing efficiency of hedging private interest risk using government bond
yields.20 A similar result is also obtained when using swaps instead of government bond
securities (Chart 11), which means that credit risk factors possibly account for this
development. Table 9 shows correlations of treasuries and swaps with corporate bonds
                                                                
19 The year 1998 is not considered given the anomalous behaviour of markets during the autumn crisis.
20 Data on corporate bond yields in the euro area are taken from Merrill Lynch.
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between 1999 and 2001.21 Like in the US, the relative superiority of swaps tends to increase
with the horizon. But, in contrast to the US evidence, swaps appear to be the best hedging
vehicle for all horizons.
5. OUTLOOK
Market integration and changes in market structure
The introduction of the euro has contributed, among other factors, to a reduction in
the degree of fragmentation among euro-area government bond markets. However, at
present these markets are not fully integrated due to remaining barriers such as the
heterogeneous tax regime within the euro area and the lack of integration of its clearing and
settlement systems.
The lack of co-ordination between issuers is sometimes cited as another element
hampering market integration. However, a higher homogeneity of products is neither a
sufficient nor a necessary condition for market integration.
Progress in market integration will involve obvious gains for both investors and
issuers due to the reduction in trading costs. This, in turn, would positively affect the market
liquidity of traded securities. All these developments would ultimately improve some of the
functions performed by government bond markets.
Another area in which changes in market structure can improve market functioning is
in the futures contracts. As was discussed in Section 3, the futures contracts based on
German bonds are currently used for managing euro interest rate risks and not only
German bond interest rate risks. As a result, the size of the futures market is large as
compared with the underlying market. This has created ideal conditions for squeezes. The
existence of squeezes may introduce distortions into the pricing of securities traded in the
cash, derivative and repo markets that negatively affect the market functioning. In IMF
(2001b), some measures are proposed to reduce the chance of squeezes, such as the
increasing issue sizes, reopening issues when a squeeze is likely, introducing of cash
settlement for futures contracts and enlarging the basket of deliverable bonds.
                                                                
21 Unfortunately, no data are available on corporate bond yields denominated in euro-area currencies before 1998.
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The search for substitute securities for treasury securities
As argued in Section 4, a number of factors including the multiplicity of issuers, the
existence of market microstructure factors and, to some extent, the reduction in the relative
supply of bonds, have affected some of the functions traditionally performed by government
bond markets. The effects of the reduction in the relative supply of bonds have hitherto
been limited in the euro area compared with what has occurred in the US. However, the
evidence in the US markets shows that an acceleration of the reduction in the relative
supply of bonds in the euro area may have important effects for market functioning. The
appearance of such effects would largely depend on the existence of substitute instruments.
Against this background, an analysis is made of what securities could replace
treasury securities in their functions, and their relative advantages and shortcomings
compared with government bonds. More specifically, the focus is on the following functions:
i) benchmark status to extract information on inflation and output outlook, ii) use as risk-free
securities for investment and for use as collateral, iii) benchmark status for pricing of other
fixed-income securities, and iv) instruments used for hedging of interest-rate risks.
Interest rate swaps are frequently cited as instruments that can stand in for some of
these functions.22 In this regard, swaps have a number of advantages over government
securities. First, coupon-related effects do not appear in their valuation since they always
reflect the rate of a par bond. Second, the relative liquidity of this market, compared with
that of government bond markets, has improved significantly since the introduction of the
euro.23 This effect is mainly a consequence of the concentration of liquidity in one single
instrument. Third, a single curve is observed in the swap market. Fourth, the absence of
underlying fundamental assets for swaps means that there is no supply limit and no need to
borrow securities to go short. And, finally, unlike government bonds, this market is
completely integrated.
Another distinctive feature of the swap rates is the presence of a credit risk premium
embedded in their pricing, related to the risk of highly rated financial institutions. Depending
on the aim pursued and what the market circumstances are, this feature of swaps may be
an advantage or a shortcoming. For the purpose of extracting information on expectations
about some macroeconomic variables, the existence of credit risk premia in the swaps
market will distort the information content of interest rates. Conversely, for the purpose of
hedging private interest rate or pricing other private fixed-income securities, the existence of
a credit risk premium embedded in swap rates will normally be an advantage since this
premium tends to be highly correlated with credit risk premia of other private securities. In
                                                                
22 See BIS (2001b), IMF (2001a), IMF (2001b) and Fleming (2000).
23 The average bid-ask spread of euro 10-year swap rates was 2.7 basis points between January 1999 and July 2001, which
compares with an average of 3.4 basis points for the DM 10-year swap rate between 1996 and 1998.
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this regard, the surge in the size of the swap market in the euro area suggests that an
increasing number of participants are using this market to hedge interest rate risks.24
Nonetheless, under certain circumstances – for instance, stress in the financial sector-
these correlations may be low or even negative.
The existence of counterparty credit risk is another shortcoming of swaps. However,
this risk is currently very low given the set of collateralisation and documentation standards
recently developed by dealers and customers.
Swaps cannot be used to replace government securities in other functions such as
investment and their use as collateral. At the same time, some market indicators such as
those derived from inflation-indexed bonds are not currently available from swaps markets.
To perform these functions an alternative highly rated instrument is needed. Recent
developments in the euro area indicate that asset- and mortgage-backed securities, such as
the German Pfandbriefe, may meet this need. Their increasing liquidity and the fact they are
normally highly rated are the main advantages. In this respect, these securities are
increasingly used as collateral by some institutions and the ECB currently accepts most of
them as collateral in its monetary policy operations. But these instruments currently
evidence shortcomings that limit their advantages over government bonds, namely their
lower liquidity and the existence of a prepayment risk embedded in their pricing.
Additionally, the fact these instruments normally have a higher credit risk than government
bonds means that they cannot be perfect substitutes. More specifically, some investors
might be forced to assume a level of risk above that desired. In the collateral transactions,
higher risk can be easily overcome by introducing higher haircuts than those applied to
comparable government bonds.
The foregoing discussion suggests there are currently certain instruments capable of
performing some of the functions traditionally undertaken by government bonds. Although
these instruments have some advantages over government bonds, they also have
shortcomings. Thus, the optimal instrument is not easy to establish and will depend on a
number of factors including the aim pursued. For the purpose of extracting information on
the inflation and output outlook, the advantage of using an alternative security in the euro
area is not clear. Possibly, a better alternative would be to complement the information
provided by the government bond market rather than replace it. Conversely, swaps will
normally be better instruments for the purpose of hedging private interest rate risk or pricing
private fixed-income securities. In this regard, Section 4 reveals that, in the euro area,
swaps are a better hedging vehicle than treasuries.
                                                                
24 According to BIS (BIS (2001a), the size of the market, approximated by the notional amount outstanding, has increased
by 32% between 1998 and 2000.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analysed recent key developments in euro-area government bond
markets and their main implications for central banks and for market functioning. The
introduction of the euro and the relative reduction in the supply of bonds have been
identified as the two main driving forces.
The introduction of the euro has affected the trading strategies of investors and has
prompted some reorganisation of the markets ultimately reflected in greater market
integration. However, euro-area government bond markets are at present far from being
fully integrated. Given the advantages associated with greater integration, it would be
desirable to continue efforts to eliminate obstacles that currently seem to contribute to
fragmentation.
The introduction of the euro has also affected the relative pricing of securities. To
see this the determinants of yield spreads before and after Monetary Union have been
analysed. The spreads over German bonds of previously high-yield debt have narrowed
significantly. By contrast, the spreads of all other euro-area sovereign debt have widened
after the introduction of the euro. It was argued that this evidence might reflect an increase
in differences in both liquidity and genuine credit risk between the German securities and
the other euro-area sovereign debt.  A change in pricing due to greater market integration is
not ruled out. It has also been shown that market microstructure factors, such as relative
market liquidity and the cheapest-to-deliver status of bonds, play a part in determining
relative prices in addition to differences in credit risk.
It was argued that the existence of these market microstructure effects together with
the multiplicity of sovereign issuers in the euro area limits some of the functions traditionally
performed by government bond markets, such as their status as a benchmark for pricing
other fixed-income securities, their usefulness for hedging interest rate risks or the
extraction of relevant information for the inflation and output outlook.
The reduction in the relative supply of government bonds has hitherto had a limited
effect in the euro area, contrasting with the evidence in the US market. The experience in
the US shows that the continuation of this process in the euro area may have relevant
effects and implications for market functioning. The appearance of such effects would
largely depend on the existence of substitute instruments.
Against this background, interest rate swaps appear to be instruments capable of
replacing government securities in some of their functions. However, the existence of a
time-varying credit risk premium embedded in swap rates means that, depending on the
aim pursued and under certain market circumstances, the relative advantages of these
instruments might be offset by their costs. For the purpose of hedging private interest rate
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risk or pricing private fixed-income securities, swaps are probably better instruments.
Conversely, for the purpose of extracting information on the inflation and output outlook, the
advantage of using an alternative security to government bonds is not clear. Possibly, a
better alternative would be to complement the information provided by the government bond
market rather than replace it.
Finally, swaps cannot be used to replace government securities in certain other
functions such as investment and use as collateral. To perform these functions, highly rated
private paper is needed, but the higher credit risk of these alternative instruments as
compared with government bonds means that they are not perfect substitutes.
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Austria        106
Belgium        243
Germany        700
Spain          281
Finland        53
France         661
Ireland        22
Italy 1102
Luxemburg 1
Netherlands    186
Portugal 49
Greece 106
Euro Area 3510
United States (a) 3217
Japan (a) 3897
Sources: ECB, BIS.
(a) December 2000.
EUR billions
TABLE 1
Size of government securities markets. Outstanding amounts. July 2001
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Euro area goverment 2855 2977 3112 3239 3317 3508
Other public debt 93 95 96 100 109 115
Financial institutions 1836 1975 2146 2467 2680 2825
Non-financial corporations 261 258 271 319 374 416
Non-residents - - 441 631 793 889
TOTAL - - 6067 6756 7273 7754
Memorandum item:
Euro area gov / TOTAL (%) - - 51.30 47.95 45.61 45.24
Euro area gov / Resid. sectors (%) 56.58 56.12 55.32 52.89 51.19 51.10
Source: ECB.
(a) End of period, June for 2001.
EUR billions
TABLE 2
Stock of euro-denominated fixed-income securities (a)
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TOTAL MFI
Other fin. 
Corporations
Other
1991 83.8 43.0 12.5 28.2 16.0
1992 82.4 43.3 12.3 26.9 17.6
1993 78.1 41.1 12.6 24.3 22.0
1994 80.3 42.7 14.1 23.4 19.7
1995 79.0 41.1 14.7 23.0 21.0
1996 78.5 40.2 17.5 21.0 21.5
1997 76.5 38.9 19.3 18.3 23.7
1998 73.2 36.9 22.2 14.2 26.8
1999 69.5 35.1 20.7 13.7 30.5
2000 66.5 33.8 19.4 13.4 33.5
Source: ECB.
Non-residents
Resident sector
%
TABLE 3
Ownership of euro-area government securities
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 (a)
German bonds 596,390 827,981 1,211,089 1,402,122 1,323,842 1,639,148
EUREX (b) 172,424 341,019 1,055,158 1,402,122 1,323,842 1,639,148
LIFFE 423,967 486,962 155,931 0 0 0
French bonds (MATIF) 224,366 214,397 145,910 51,092 360,975 301,000
Spanish bonds (MEFF) 93,337 104,848 78,386 29,810 9,121 3,772
Italian bonds 130,507 150,527 74,506 11,404 123 0
LIFFE 106,191 125,097 63,379 9,835 109 0
MIF 24,315 25,430 11,127 1,569 14 0
TOTAL 1,044,599 1,297,754 1,509,891 1,494,427 1,694,061 1,943,921
Sources: FIBV, Banca d'Italia, LIFFE, EUREX, MEFF, EURONEXT
(a) To June.
(b) Formerly DTB
Monthly average, EUR millions
TABLE 4
10-year euro-area bond futures trading in selected markets
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After EMU (1999-2001)
Spread
Foreign exchange
 factor (b)
Other Spread
Austria 9.7 1.3 8.4 26.2
Belgium 19.0 4.5 14.5 31.0
Finland 46.2 40.9 5.3 22.8
France 3.8 -2.9 6.8 13.1
Ireland 45.4 36.6 8.9 23.1
Italy 154.4 132.2 22.2 31.5
Netherlands -2.2 -3.8 1.6 14.8
Spain 114.9 96.4 18.6 27.0
(a) Spread over German bonds.
Before EMU (1996-1998)
(b) Approximated as the spread beween the swap rate in the currency of denomination of the bond and the swap rate  in DM.
Basis points
TABLE 5
10-year yield spreads before and after  EMU. Breakdown by factors (a)
On-the-run issues
2 years 4.0 (-0.5;9.0) 3.3 (-1.4;9.0) 5.0 (1.7;9.0)
5 years 4.6 (-3.3;10.4) 2.6 (-6.6;9.1) 7.2 (3.5;11.2)
10 years 11.6 (6.3;16.3) 9.3 (5.9;12.8) 14.7 (11.9;17.0)
30 years 8.5 (2.4;13.7) 5.9 (1.9;9.9) 11.8 (9.3;14.8)
Other issues
2-5 years 0.1 (-2.7;3.3) -1.0 (-3.2;1.5) 1.6 (-1.4;4.0)
5-10 years -0.4 (-8.1;9.5) -5.2 (-8.5;-0.9) 6.0 (1.1;10.8)
10-30 years 6.6 (-1.0;13.0) 3.3 (-2.7;7.6) 11.0 (7.7;13.4)
In brackets: 5th and 95th percentiles.
1/1/99 - 28/5/01
Mean (5%;95%)
1/1/99 - 30/4/00
Mean (5%;95%)
1/5/00 - 28/5/01
Mean (5%;95%)
Yield discrepancies are computed as the differences in yield errors in order to control for differences in cash flow
structure. Yield errors are the difference between observed and estimated yields. The latter were estimated using the
Nelson and Siegel model.
Basis points
TABLE 6
Yield discrepancies between French and German government bonds, adjusted 
for different cash flow structure
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German Market -6.4 (-9.3;-3.3) -6.5 (-9.5;-2.8) -6.2 (-8.5;-4.8)
French Market -2.8 (-5.0;-1.0) -2.3 (-3.8;-0.7) -3.5 (-5.3;-1.4)
Spanish Market -4.6 (-8.3;-1.1) -6.1 (-8.5;-3.6) -2.8 (-4.7;-0.7)
1/1/99 - 28/5/01
Mean (5%;95%)
1/1/99 - 30/4/00
Mean (5%;95%)
1/5/00 - 28/5/01
Mean (5%;95%)
Basis points
TABLE 7
Relative liquidity premia in selected euro-area government securities markets
In brackets: 5th and 95th percentiles.
A dummy variable that takes value 1 for the last two on-the-run issues is introduced in the Nelson and Siegel model. 
Liquidity premia are approximated as the estimates of the dummy parameter.
Treasury Swap Treasury Swap
Weekly 
AAA 0.982 0.939 0.941 0.891
AA 0.980 0.936 0.959 0.920
A 0.978 0.936 0.953 0.914
B 0.972 0.928 0.946 0.906
4-weekly
AAA 0.990 0.979 0.944 0.920
AA 0.986 0.975 0.953 0.942
A 0.984 0.975 0.947 0.939
B 0.975 0.968 0.925 0.923
8-weekly
AAA 0.994 0.985 0.947 0.952
AA 0.994 0.986 0.939 0.952
A 0.989 0.983 0.921 0.951
B 0.980 0.975 0.892 0.942
1991-1997 1999-2001
%
TABLE 8
Correlations with corporate bond yields. US market. 10-year yields
   Weekly changes. Data computed as weekly average of daily rates. All data are taken from Bloomberg. 
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Treasury Swap
Weekly
AAA 0.951 0.956
AA 0.959 0.960
A 0.943 0.949
BBB 0.754 0.773
4-weekly
AAA 0.943 0.976
AA 0.936 0.981
A 0.875 0.943
BBB 0.517 0.654
8-weekly
AAA 0.976 0.990
AA 0.970 0.991
A 0.948 0.978
BBB 0.860 0.870
1999-2001
%
TABLE 9
Correlations with corporate bond yields. Euro-area market. 10-year yields
   Weekly changes. Data computed as weekly average of daily rates. Data on treasury yields and swap rates are 
taken from Bloomberg. Data on corporate bond yields are taken from Merrill Lynch.
Volatility of euro-area 10-year government bond yields
CHART 1
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Before EMU After EMU
%%
Volatility computed as the standard deviation of daily changes in yields.
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10-year government bond yields by risk category (June 2001)
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SP
FR
NL
PO
IR
GE
GR
AU
FI
IT
BE
5.0
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5.0
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
%%
risk category
Y
ie
ld
Source: Bloomberg.
Zero-coupon yield spread between French and German government bonds
CHART 3
   Zero-coupon yields are estimated using the Nelson Siegel model.
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10-year swap spreads
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5-day moving average. The swap spread in the euro-area market is computed using  German bonds, and before 
1999, swap rates in DM. All data are taken from Bloomberg.
10-year swap spread adjusted for credit risk
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Weekly data. To adjust swap spread for credit risk we first regress the swap on a constant and a proxy for credit risk 
(yield spread between B and AAA-rated corporate bonds). The adjusted spread is computed as the difference 
between the swap rate and the estimated credit risk term.
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Slope of the yield curve, US markets
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Slope computed as the spread between 10-year and 2-year yields. 5-day moving average. Data are taken from 
Bloomberg.
Slope of the yield curve, euro-area markets
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Slope computed as the spread between 10-year and 2-year yields. 5-day moving average.  German bonds for 
government debt. DM swap rates before 1999. Data are taken from Bloomberg.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA/DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N. 012030
Correlation between private and government debt 10-year yields, US markets
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20-week rolling correlations of weekly changes. Data computed as the average of daily rates. Data are taken from 
Bloomberg.
Correlation between 10-year private debt yields and 10-year swap rates, US 
markets
CHART 9
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Sep-91 Sep-92 Sep-93 Sep-94 Sep-95 Sep-96 Sep-97 Sep-98 Sep-99 Sep-00
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
AAA AA A B
%%
20-week rolling correlations of weekly changes. Data computed as the average of daily rates. Data are taken from 
Bloomberg.
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Correlation between private and government debt 10-year yields, euro-area 
markets
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20-week rolling correlations of weekly changes. Data computed as the average of daily rates. German bonds for 
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Correlation between 10-year private debt yields and 10-year swap rates, euro-
area markets
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